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Preference of Social Choice in Mathematical Economics 
 
Jamal Nazrul Islam*, Haradhan Kumar Mohajan**, and Pahlaj Moolio***
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Mathematical Economics is closely related with Social Choice Theory. In this paper, an attempt has 
been made to show this relation by introducing utility functions, preference relations and Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem with easier mathematical calculations. The paper begins with some 
definitions which are easy but will be helpful to those who are new in this field. The preference 
relations will give idea in individual’s and social choices according to their budget. Economists 
want to create maximum utility in society and the paper indicates how the maximum utility can be 
obtained. Arrow’s theorem indicates that the aggregate of individuals’ preferences will not satisfy 
transitivity, indifference to irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship simultaneously so that one of 
the individuals becomes a dictator. The Combinatorial and Geometrical approach facilitate 
understanding of Arrow’s theorem in an elegant manner. 
 
JEL. Classification: C51; D11; D21; D78; D92 
 
Key words: Utility Function, Preference Relation, Indifference Hypersurface, Social Choice, 
Arrow’s Theorem.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper is related to Welfare of Economics and Sociology, in particular Social Choice Theory. 
Here we have tried to give various aspects of economics and sociology in mathematical terms. The 
presentation here is essentially a review of other’s works, but we have tried to give the definitions 
and mathematical calculations more clearly, so that one may find the paper naive and simple. We 
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B→
hope that here the mathematicians will find the economics useful, and vice-versa. We have also 
included “Social Choice Theory” which is regarded as a part of Mathematical Economics.  
 
In section 2, we give some definitions, which are very simple, but will be very helpful for those who 
are new in this field. Preference relations and utility functions are included in section 3 which are 
based on Arrow (1959, 1963), Cassels (1981), Myerson (1996), Islam (1997, 2008) and Pahlaj 
(2002). Arrow’s impossibility theorem, its combinatorial and geometrical interpretation is given 
more clearly in section 4 which are based on Arrow (1963), Sen (1970), Barbera (1980), Cassels 
(1981), Islam (1997, 2008), Ubeda (2003), Geanokoplos (2005), Feldman , Serrano (2006) and  
Breton, Weymark  (2006) , Feldman  and  Serrano ( 2007,2008 ), Suzumuro (2007), Miller  (2009), 
Sato  (2009). 
 
2. A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON SETS, FUNCTIONS, VECTORS AND OPTIMIZATION 
 
A set is any well defined collection of objects. Let A and B be two sets .The Cartesian product A × B 
of A and B is the set of pair (x, y) where x∈A and y ∈ B. A function f from A to B is a rule which 
assigns to each x∈A, a unique element f(x) ∈B. A more formal definition is as follows:  
 
A function f : A→ B is a subset of A× B, such that  
i) if x ∈A , there is a set y∈B   such that  (x, y) ∈ f    ii) such an element  y is unique , that is , if  x 
∈A,  y, z∈B   such that ( x, y) ∈f, (x, z) ∈f  then y = z . 
If   is a function, then the image ofAf : ( )Aff , , is the subset of B defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) xxfAf { }A∈= / , that is, ( ) (xfAf  consists of elements of B of the form , where x is 
some element of A. Here A is the domain and B is the co-domain.  A function f: A→ B    is surjective 
if each element of B is the image of some element of A. The function f is an injective if for all x, y∈ 
A, f(x) = f(y) implies x = y. The function is bijective if it is both injective and surjective.  
)
 
A correspondence φ  from a set A to a set B is a relation which associates with each element x of A a 
non-empty subset ( )xφ   of B. Generally, if f is a function from a set A onto a set B then for every y 
∈ B,  is a non-empty subset of A, and so  is a correspondence from B to A. (y1
n
)f − 1−f
 
Let us consider the set of all n -tuples of real numbers which is denoted by R and is called n-
dimensional Euclidean space. A typical element or a vector in this space is denoted 
by , where ( )nx )xx ,...,, 21=x ( nixi ,...,2,1=  are real numbers. We will use the words ‘points’ 
and ‘vectors’ interchangeably; the point x can be associated with the directed line segment from the 
origin 0= (0,0,...,0) to the point x. A convex set is defined as follows: Consider a set C which is such 
that , if x and are in C, so are all the vectors of the form tx + (1 – t) x′ x′  with  , in other 
words, if the set C contains points x and 
1≤t0 ≤
x′ , it also contains all the points lying in the straight line 
joining x and . For example in x′ 2R  the interior of a circle is convex, in 3R  the interior of a sphere 
is convex, etc. Let us consider a function f(x) where ( )nxxx ,...,, 21=x , then by a hypersurface we 
mean the set of points in nR for which f(x)= constant. For different values of the constant, we find 
corresponding different hypersurfaces. For n = 3 we have different surfaces, on the other hand for n 
= 2 we have simply curves. The indifference hypersurfaces do not intersect each other in the finite 
region. Since all the components of the vectors are non-negative so we will deal here only with non-
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negative coordinates. For n = 2 the curves lie in the first quadrant and for n = 3 the surfaces lie in the 
first octant.  
For a function f(x) to be optimum (maximum or minimum) ( ) .0=′= xf
dx
df
 If 0<2
2
dx
fd
0x=
 at 
 the function is maximum at a point x 0xx =  and if 02
2
>
dx
fd
 at 0xx =  the function is 
minimum at a point . If 0xx = ( )yxf ,  be a function of two variables x and y then for 
optimum ( ) ( yx feiyffeixf ..0.. ∂∂==∂∂ ), and . If02 >− xyyyxx fff ( )0  and 0 >> yyxx ff , then 
the function has a minimum point, if ( )0  and 0 << yyxx ff  then the function has a maximum 
point. For , there is neither a maximum nor a minimum, but a saddle point. In all 
cases, the tangent plane at the extremum (maximum, minimum or a saddle point) to the surface 
, is parallel to the z-plane. If , one has to apply other considerations 
to determine the nature of the extremum. 
0
( )yx,
( )nx nyyy ,...,, 21=y n
2 <− xyyyxx fff
fz = 02 =− xyyyxx fff
 
3. UTILITY FUNCTION  
 
We consider vectors 
  and  in xx ,...,, 21=x ( ) R , then for all i (1a)  ii yx ≥⇒≥ yx
y
iy>
x
)
xyxyx ≠≥⇒> but   , that is is different from  for at least one i                (1b) ix iy
ix⇒>> yx  for all i                    (1c)  
 
Now we introduce the notion of preference (Arrow 1959, 1963, Islam 1997, Myerson 1996, Breton 
and  Weymark  2006 ,Feldman  and  Serrano 2007,2008 , Suzumuro 2007, Miller  2009, Sato  
2009). 
 Suppose two bundles of commodities are represented by the vectors x and y. The components 
represent amounts of different commodities in some unit, such as kilogram. We assume that one 
prefers the bundle x to the bundle y or he prefers y to x, or he is indifferent to the choice between x 
and y. We can write these possibilities, respectively, as follows: 
 xPy, yPx, xIy.        (2) 
 
Sometimes we use the notation  
               x Ry                                                       (3) 
to mean that either x is preferred to y or x is indifferent to y, so that y is not preferred to x. If xPy 
then it is not necessary that all the commodities of x are greater than all the corresponding 
components of y. We can write that it is not necessary that x >> y or even .  y≥
We now define the utility function (Islam, 1997, 2008) as,  
 .       (4) ( ) ( nxxxuu ,...,, 21x =
 
In preference relation we can write 
Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
 
Preference of Social Choice in Mathematical Economics                                      By P. Moolio, J. N. Islam, and H.K. Mohajan 21
y
0 0x)0}0
)}
( )0x
x .
2x1
k=
)
c
c
 u(x) > u (y)  .       (5) xP⇔
  
Let us consider a fixed vector , and consider the set of all the vectors x which are preferred to . 
If we denote this set by , we can write (Cassels, 1981) 
x
(xV
 .       (6) ( ) {0 xxxx PV :=
For the utility function it can be written as,  
       (7) ( ) ( ) ({ 0: xxxx0 uuV >=
where V  is a convex set. 
 
We now introduce the idea of a budget constraint. For bundle x with a price vector p let us consider 
one has maximum c amount of taka or dollars to spend, then we can write, 
 ; ( p  is the price of the bundle x)    (8)  c≤xp  .
which is referred to as budget constraint. Let us consider the hypersurfaces  
  u(x) = constant,        (9) 
for various values of the constant. According to (5) the individual concerned is indifferent to the 
bundles represented by all these vectors i.e., all these bundles for him are ‘equally good’ (or ‘equally 
bad’). That is why (9) are indifferent hypersurfaces. For simplicity we consider n = 2, so, 
 .        (10) ( ) xu x =
The indifference curves are given by rectangular hyperbolae, 
         (11) xx 21
where, k = constant > 0. 
Let the fixed price vector  be  then by (8) the budget constraint is ( 21, pp=p
        (12) xpxp ≤+ 2211
with fixed c. 
If we draw a straight line (AB), 
        (13) xpxp =+ 2211
then there is only one member of family of indifference curves (11) that touches the straight line 
(13). Let it touch at the point ( 21, xx )  which is a vector and it maximizes the utility (see figure – 1).   
  
The inequality (12) restricts ( 21, xx )
( )
 to the interior or boundary of the triangle OAB,   
where, 
2
2
2
1 pp
cON += , which is parallel to the vector  p. 
The maximum of the utility function must occur on the line AB but not in the interior of triangle 
OAB. The indifference curve which gives the maximum is (Islam, 1997)  
 
21
2
221 4 pp
cxxxx ≡= 1 .   (See Appendix – I)   (14) 
From (14), we get 
121
2
2 4 xpp
cx =  and substituting in (13) yields, 
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 c
xp
cxp =+
11
2
11 4
 
whose discriminant is zero, so (13) has two common roots 21 xx =  and the curve and the line touch 
at a point ( . We will show maximality of indifference hypersurface in Appendix – I. )21, xx
2x
 
                   
 
 
 
 
                       
            
              A 
   
                                             
                                           
                                     
                                            N             
                                         P                ( )21, xx  
 
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                    
                                           
                                       
                O                                                                          B                            1x
                      Figure-1                                                                       
             Figure-1: The point (  maximizes the utility. ON is parallel to price vector p which                        
is perpendicular to AB. 
)21, xx
n
 
In R  we consider a single indifference hypersurface, 
 ,        (15) ( )u =x 0k
0k
p  .
for some fixed . For every price vector p>0, there is a particular vector x which minimizes the 
cost  for all the vectors x on this hypersurface. Since the vector depends on p we write it as x
(px ) p′ ′′, for all x lying on (15). If there are two price vectors  and  and 
write
p
( ) (pxxpxx =′′′=′  , )′′  that is, the vectors x′  and x ′′  minimize the total cost  
 respectively on the hypersurface (15), so that we have  xp .′′xp  and  .′
xpxpxpxp ′′≥′′′′′≥′′′ . . and . . ′′  
 ( ) ( ) 0. and 0. ≤′−′′′′≤′′−′′⇒ xxpxxp .    (16) 
Adding these two inequalities we get, 
 ( )( )  0. ≤′′−′′′−′⇒ xxpp .       (17) 
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This is known as the substitution theorem. 
 Now let the two vectors p′  and p ′′   differ only in their ith   components that is 
i,j,  ,   ≠′′=′′′≠′ jjii pppp then 
 ( )( )  0. ≤′′−′′′−′⇒ iiii xxpp .
x.′
                                                                                (18) 
Since p  minimized by ( ) xpx ′=′  and ( ) xpx ′′=′′   then    substituting  p ippi ′+′=′′ δ  in (18) 
we get 
     ( ) ( )( ) 0 - ≤′+′′′− iii ppxpxp δδ . 
Now  ( ) ( )    i
i
i
iiii p
x ppxppx ′∂
∂′=′+′ δδ  so that we can write (assuming ip′δ >0) 
 0≤∂
∂
i
i
p
x
.        (19) 
The Reciprocity theorem is given as follows. (For proof see Appendix -II); 
 ,
i
j
p
x
32 , x
j
i
p
x
∂
∂=∂
∂
        (20) 
where   i ≠ j. 
 To examine the significance of the Reciprocity theorem (20) we let n =3 and 
consider  to refer to the three commodities tea, coffee and sugar respectively. For  i=1 , 
j=2  we get from (20), 
1, xx
 .
1
2
p
x
2p 2x
1p
2
1
p
x
∂
∂=∂
∂
        (21) 
If the common value of (21) is positive, the function increases with  and same as for  and 
. This can be explained as, if the price of tea goes up, we drink more coffee, and vice versa. In 
this case the commodities are said to be substitutes. 
1x
For  i=1,  j=3  we get from  (20), 
 .
1
3
p
x
3p 3x
1p
3
1
p
x
∂
∂=∂
∂
        (22) 
If the common value is negative, so that the function  decrease as  increase and decreases 
as  increases, the rate of decrease being the same, which we can interpret as saying that as the 
price of sugar goes up we drink less tea, and if the price of tea goes up we buy less sugar to 
minimize the cost and keep the total utility the same. In this situation the commodities are said to be 
complements. 
1x
 
4. ARROW’S THEOREM 
 
4.1 Pre-Requisites 
 
Arrow’s original form of his theorem appeared in his book (1963). The form given here is based as 
Sen (1970), Cassels (1981), Islam (1997, 2008), Ubeda (2005), Geanokoplos (2006) and Breton , 
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A
xPy
⇒
APz
BPx
CPy
i
Weymark (2006), Sato (2009).  Arrow’s theorem deals with the manner in which the preferences of 
a group of individuals are combined to yield the preferences of a group. We can explain it by a 
simple example known as paradox of the voter. Suppose we have a community consisting of three 
individuals A, B and C. Assume that they have three alternatives x, y, z from which to choose. Let x, 
y, and z stands respectively for hot war, cold war or peace with another group of individuals. If A 
prefers x to y, and y to z then we write  
                                etc.      (23)  AA PzPyx
Here we omit indifference between two alternatives; that is for x and y we have  
.We assume that choices x, y and z are transitive, that is, 
yPxor     
 xPy and yPz xPz.       (24) 
For voter paradox, suppose the preference relation for A, B and C are as follows; 
         (25a) AAPyx
         (25b) BBPzy
 .        (25c) CC Pxz
Now we impose two conditions on the group preference of x, y, z as follows; 
i) it must be transitive 
ii) it should satisfy the majority rule, that is, if  out of three people two prefer x to y, then the 
group prefers x to y. 
Now we want to impose two conditions which are (i) the relation should be transitive and  (ii) 
the relation should satisfy the majority rule. From (25) we see that x is preferred to y by A and C, so 
that, by the majority rule, x is preferred to y by the group. Again, we see that y is preferred to z by A 
and B, again by the majority rule y is preferred to z by the group. Since we claim that the group 
choice be transitive, so that x will be preferred to z by the group. If we now require that the group 
choice be transitive, we deduce that x is preferred to z by the group. However, from (25 b, c) we see 
that in fact z is preferred to x by  B and C, so that by the majority rule z should be preferred to x. 
Thus we see that in the situation that the individual choice is given by (25a-c) it is not possible to 
impose the requirements of transitivity and majority rule simultaneously, although these conditions 
are fairly reasonable. 
 
The above problem expresses the fact that certain difficulties arise when we try to work out the 
preference of a group from those of the individuals in it, even when one wants reasonable 
requirements to be satisfied. Arrow’s theorem deals with such impossibility of finding group 
preference.              
 
We consider a finite set U of n individuals and we denote a typical individual by u  (i=1, 2,…, n ). 
In the above example n = 3 and a society U = {A, B, C}.We consider a finite set S consisting of ‘a’ 
alternatives or social choices which we denote by x, y, z,…. Every member of the set U has a 
preference ordering on the set S in the sense that if Syx ∈,  we have one of the following three 
possibilities for member ; iu
iIy
i
i
 .       (26)  iiiii xPxyPyx   ,  ,
For the individualu , we shall denote by  any given ordering of the set S. Similarly, we shall 
denote by W the preference ordering of the whole group U. If the individual u    prefers x to y we 
shall write, 
iw
Indus Journal of Management & Social Sciences, 3(1):18-38 (Spring 2009)                         http://indus.edu.pk/journal.php 
 
Preference of Social Choice in Mathematical Economics                                      By P. Moolio, J. N. Islam, and H.K. Mohajan 25
( )iw
     
iw )n
i
 .        (27)  ii Pyx  
We now want to determine W if we are given  for all i. If all the individuals prefer x to y, then 
the group should prefer x to y, that is, 
iw
     for all i ⇒ x P y (W ).                        (28) iiPyx
Arrow’s theorem is concerned with attempting to find a group or social ordering W from the 
individual orderings , 
 .       (29) ( wwwW ,...,, 21
The followings are the conditions of the theorem; 
I) W is defined when each of the  runs independently through all orderings of the set S. w
II) The condition (28) is satisfied. 
III) This condition is referred to as indifference to irrelevant alternatives and is given as follows: 
 
Let T be a subset of S. For each i, let iw′  and iw′′   induce the same ordering on T. In this case, 
 and ( )nw′ )wwW ′′ ,...,, 21 ( nwwwW ′′′′′′ ,...,, 21  induces the same ordering on T. We denote these two 
conditions by W  respectively. W ′′′,
 
The condition (III) may be slightly difficult. Let S={x, y, z}, and T={x, y}⊂ S. Consider the 
orderings of A, B, C given by CBACBA wwwwww ′′′′′′′′′ ,, and  ,,  which induce the same ordering on 
{x, y}. For example, this might be (Islam, 1997) 
 ( ) ( AAAAAA wPyxwPyx ′′ )′   ,       (30a) 
 ( ) ( BBBBBB wPyxwPyx ′′ )′   ,       (30b) 
 ( ) ( CCCCCC wPxwPxy )′′′ y  , .      (30c) 
In this case ( ) ( )CBACBA wwwWWwwwWW ′′′′′′=′′′′′=′ ,,   ,,,  induce the same ordering on x, y; that 
is, either 
  or( ) ( )WxPyWxPy ′′′  and  ( ) ( )WPxWyPx ′′′ y and  .   (31) 
Similar conditions hold if T is the subset {y, z} or {z, x}. 
We are now in a position to state Arrow’s Theorem; 
 
Arrow’s theorem: Suppose that S has at least three elements and the conditions I, II and III are 
satisfied. Then there exists an individual Uuk ∈ , such that 
    , some k, ( n wwwwW =,...,, 21 ) k nk ≤≤1    (32) 
that is, the group preference coincides with that of some one (single) individual. 
 
4.2 A COMBINATORIAL APPROACH TO ARROW’S THEOREM 
 
Let us consider the sets U and S to have three elements each (Islam, 1997). As before we denote by 
x, y, z the group choices, and by etc., the individual choices. Now there are six 
possibilities for the group preference ordering, as follows: 
AAA zyx ,,
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( )1W( )2W( )3W( )4W( )5W( )6W
         (33a) xPyPz
         (33b) xPzPy
         (33c) yPzPx
         (33d) yPxPz
         (33e) zPxPy
 .        (33f) zPyPx
Corresponding to (33 a-f), we have the individual preferences, six of each individual which we 
denote by  etc. The possibilities for the arguments of the 
function W are as follows; 
,...,,,,,, ,1654321 BAAAAAA wwwwwww
 ( ) 6,...,3,2,1,,  ; ,, =kjiwwwW
kji CBA .     (34) 
Thus there are 63=216 possibilities for the arguments of W, and there are six possible values (33a-f); 
so, the function W represents a map from a set consisting of 216 elements to a set consisting of six 
elements. Arrow’s theorem guarantees that one of the following three possibilities must necessarily 
hold; 
 
( )(( ),, ,,
,,
kCBA
jCBA
iCBA
WwwwW
WwwwW
WwwwW
kji
kji
kji
=
=
=)
. 
      (35) 
That is, the group preference coincides with one of the individual preferences, so that there has to be 
a ‘dictator’ if conditions I, II, III of Arrow’s theorem are to be satisfied. 
 Now we state briefly how Arrow’s theorem is to be considered in the combinational 
approach. In this case (34) can be introduced as follows; 
 ( ) a
}6
.
CBA WwwwW kji =,,        (36) 
where  and i, j, k runs independently the values over the same set. The six values 
of ‘a’ give six possibilities (33a-f) for the group preference. 
{ ,...,3,2,1∈a
                    ∴ a = a(i, j, k) = a(i j k).      
 (37) 
Arrow’s theorem implies that if conditions I, II, III are satisfied, this map must reduce to one of the 
following three  
 a (i j k) = i ;   a (i j k) = j ;  a (i j k) = k.     (38) 
First we consider condition II for {x, y}; 
 .      (39) xPyPyxPyxPyx CCBBAA ⇒,,
We see from (33) that xPy obtains for . If we denote the set of integers {1, 2, 5}, then  
  
521 ,, WWW{ } ( ) { }5,2,15,2,1,, ∈⇒∈ ijkakji
Now we consider the condition III. Let ( ) ( )kjikji ′′′′′′′′′ ,,,,,  be two possible set of values of the 
indices i, j, k and let T={x, y}.  Condition III asserts that if these two sets of values corresponds to 
the same ordering for x, y; then 
  must induce the same ordering on x, y. So that ( ) ( kjiakjia ′′′′′′′ ,,  and  ,, )′′
∈′′i  {1, 2, 5} or {3, 4, 6}      (40a) ′i ,
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∈′′j
}5 
)′′
63
  {1, 2, 5} or {3, 4, 6}      (40b) ′j ,
  or {3, 4, 6}      (40c) { ,2 ,1, ∈′′′ kk
then, ( ) ( kjiakjia ′′′′′′′ ,,  and  ,,  are both from the set {1, 2, 5} or both from {3, 4, 6}. 
 
4.3 A GEOMETRICAL APPROACH TO THE COMBINATIONAL FORMALISM 
 
Here we introduce equations (33a-f) in the new notation: 
 0 : xPy Pz         (41a) 
 1 : xPzPy         (41b) 
 2 : yPzPx        (41c) 
 3 : yPx Pz         (41d) 
 4 : zPxPy         (41e) 
 5 : zPy Px.        (41f) 
 
Thus (000), for example, gives the group decision or preference (41a) denoted by the integer 0. In 
this case, from the rules I, II and III, it is clear that (000) =0. There are  such possibilities, 
which can be grouped into 6 groups, for convenience, as follows, in notation which should be clear 
from the above remarks (Islam, 1997). 
216=
 
The above six groups corresponds to A’s choice. In the first group A’s choice is uniformly ‘0’ in the 
second group A’s choice is ‘1’, and so on. 
A more symmetric way of representing these 216 values of the function a(i j k) in which choices of 
A, B, C are represented symmetrically, is through a cubic lattice in a three-dimensional Euclidean 
space containing  points. This is displayed in the figure-2. 216666 =××
 
The points can be grouped into six lattice planes (each containing 36 points) which are parallel to 
the (i j) plane, to the (j k) plane, or to the (i k) plane. These correspond to the grouping according to 
C’s choice, to B’s choice and to A’s choice respectively.  
By Arrow’s theorem if A’s choice prevails then all the points on any one lattice plane parallel to the 
(j k) plane must have the same value, the value given by the i entry in (i j k), for B all the points in 
any lattice plane parallel to the (i k) plane has the same value, corresponding to the entry j in (i j k); 
similar condition holds for C. 
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(000)         (001)          (002)           (003)         (004)           (005)         
(010)         (011)          (012)           (013)         (014)           (015)       
(020)         (021)          (022)           (023)         (024)           (025)        
(030)         (031)          (032)           (033)         (034)           (035)       
(040)         (041)          (042)           (043)         (044)           (045)        
(050)         (051)          (052)           (053)         (054)           (055) 
(100)         (101)          (102)           (103)         (104)           (105)          
(110)         (111)          (112)           (113)         (114)           (115)          
(120)         (121)          (122)           (123)         (124)           (125)                     
(130)         (131)          (132)           (133)          (134)          (135)     
(140)         (141)          (142)           (143)          (144)          (145)             
(150)         (151)          (152)           (153)          (154)          (155)       
(200)         (201)          (202)           (203)          (204)          (205) 
(210)         (211)          (212)           (213)          (214)          (215) 
(220)         (221)          (222)           (223)          (224)          (225) 
(230)         (231)          (232)           (233)          (234)          (235) 
(240)         (241)          (242)           (243)          (244)          (245) 
(250)         (251)          (252)           (253)          (254)          (255) 
(300)         (301)        (302)             (303)           (304)          (305) 
(310)         (311)        (312)             (313)           (314)          (315) 
(320)         (321)        (322)             (323)           (324)          (325) 
(330)         (331)        (332)             (333)           (334)          (335) 
(340)         (341)        (342)             (343)           (344)          (345) 
(350)         (351)        (352)             (353)           (354)          (355) 
(400)         (401)       (402)              (403)           (404)          (405) 
(410)         (411)        (412)             (413)           (414)          (415) 
(420)         (421)        (422)              (423)          (424)          (425) 
(430)         (431)        (432)              (433)          (434)          (435) 
(440)         (441)        (442)              (443)          (444)          (445) 
(450)         (451)        (452)              (453)          (454)          (455) 
(500)         (501)        (502)              (503)          (504)          (505) 
(510)         (511)        (512)              (513)          (514)          (515) 
(520)         (521)        (522)              (523)          (524)          (525) 
(530)        (531)         (532)              (533)          (534)          (535) 
(540)        (541)         (542)              (543)          (544)          (545) 
(550)        (551)         (552)              (553)          (554)          (555).    (42) 
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                                                                              Figure-2 
 
Figure-2: There are 216 points in the lattice cube where some of the points are displayed. The 
points are grouped into six lattice planes, each containing 36 points. 
 
We now explain how one can use the above formalism to give a ‘combinatorial’ proof of Arrow’s 
theorem for the particular case of three individuals and three choices. 
Let us consider the basic assumption:  
 (0 1 2)=0.        (43) 
  
Here we are simply fixing on A as the dictator. If instead of (43) we had chosen (0 1 2) =1,2 we 
would have chosen B, C respectively as the possible dictator. 
Again we consider (0 1 0). From (41 a-f) we see that in this case all three individuals prefer x to y 
and prefer x to z. The value of (0 1 0), that is, the group preference must also reflect this. So that it is 
clear from (41a-f) that 
 .        (44) ( ) 0010 ∈{ }1 ,
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We now introduce an example in the support of condition III. Let us consider the choices (010), 
(012) and the subset {y, z}; then (010) and (012) are both in the set {0,2,3} or both in the set       
                        {1,4,5}.                                   (45) 
 
From (43) it follows that (012) is in the set {0,2,3} and so (010) must also be in this set. But from 
(44), (010) is also in the set {0,1}. The only common value between the sets {0,1} and {0, 2, 3} is 0, 
and so we must have (0 10)=0. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The paper has been particularly concerned with the role of preference in mathematical economics. 
The paper is difficult and we have tried to give a basic concept how an economist depends on a 
mathematician and vice-versa. Most of the material in this paper has been taken from References: 
Islam (1997, 2008) and Pahlaj (2002). 
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APPENDIX-I 
 
Here we will show that the bundle with maximum utility must lie on the line                        
        (AI-1)  xpxp =+ 2211
but not inside the triangle. For suppose one chooses the bundles x′ lying within the triangle, as is 
figure AI-1. If we join the origin to x ′′  and continue the straight line until it makes the line (AI-1) at 
, then clearly x ′′
x>′′ ( ) ( )xx ′>′′ uu
1, xx
c
k
 , so  x ′ . 
 
Therefore, we can always find a bundle on the line (AI-1) whose utility is higher than any given 
bundle within the triangle. However, on the line there are many possible bundles (  each 
satisfying (AI-1); that is, each satisfying the budget constraint, 
)2
        (AI-2) xpxp ≤+ 2211
and which bundle should we choose to maximize his utility  
 .       (AI-3) ( ) xxxxu == 2121,
Now we will show this by geometrically. We choose the bundle ( )21, xx ′′=′x  on (AI-1). Consider 
the indifference curve passing through x′ . Let this meet the line (AI-1) again at  (Figure AI-1). 
Choose any bundle  lying between 
x ′′
x′ˆ x′  and x ′′   on the line (AI-1). Consider the indifference 
curve passing through  (dotted curve in Fig. AI-1). Here the utility of all the points on 2′ˆˆˆ xxx 1′=′
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x′ˆ ′
0
this curve will be higher than k. Similarly if we chose a point between the points  and  whose 
utility will be higher. Clearly this process can be continued until we come to the point y at which on 
indifference curve is tangent to the line (AI-1). This point or bundle will clearly maximize the 
utility, whose amount will be . 
x′ˆ
k
 
The same result can be obtained algebraically as follows: 
From (AI-1) we get 
(
2
2
1 pc
p
x −= )11x , and utility is ( ) ( ) ( )1111
2
21
1 xfxpcx
p
xxu =−==x  say,          
( )
1
111
21 2
021
p
cxxpc
pdx
df =⇒=−=  
0<2
2
1
2
1
2
−=
p
p
dx
fd
, 
so that ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
3x
c
c
⎜⎜⎝
⎛==
2
21 2
,
2
,
1
p
c
p
cxxy  is a maximum point on the line (AI-1) and hyperbolic  
curve (AI-3) but not inside the triangle. 
 
Let us now consider n=3. Here we will show that the maximum utility must lie on the plane. Let us 
consider the utility function  
        (AI-4) ( ) 21321 ,, xxxxxu =
and the budget constraint; 
       (AI-5) xpxpxp ≤++ 332211
and the plane, 
       (AI-6) xpxpxp =++ 332211
 ( )2211
3
3
1 xpxpc
p
x −−=  and ( ) ( )2211
3
21
21, xpxpcp
xxxxf −−=  
( ) 02 2211
3
2 =−− xpxpc
p
x
0
02 2211
  ⇒= 0
1x
f  
       (AI-7) 2 2211 =−+⇒ cxpxp
=−+ cxpxp  ⇒= 0
2x
f .     (AI-8)  
Solving (AI-7) & (AI-8) we get, 
1
1x = 3p
c
, 
2
2 3p
cx = ; 
3
c
2
1
3
21
3
22
11 pp
p
p
xpf xx −=−=  and 
31
2
3
2
22 pp
cpf xx −= , 
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( )
3
2211
3 3
221
21 p
cxpxpc
p
f xx −=−−= , 
.0
3
2   and      0
399
4
32
1
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
21
<−=>=−=
pp
cpf
p
c
p
c
p
cD xx  
So, the utility function is maximum on the plane and on the indifference hypersurface. 
 
Now the same result can be generalized algebraically as follows: 
 
Let us consider the parabola ( )12222 4 xabx −=  and the utility is, 
( ) ( ) ( 121121
2
21
2 xfxax
p
abxxu =−==x ) , (say) 
( )
( ) 211122
2
1
32
xap
xaab
dx
df
−
−=  abxax 2 and   
3
2
2
2
1 ==⇒  
0<39
2
2
1
2
−=
p
b
dx
fd
.  So that ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= aba 2,
3
2 2y  is a maximum point on the parabola and 
hyperbolic curve (AI-3). 
.   
                                                       2x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       x′  
                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                      x′ˆ  
                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                      y
                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                    xˆ ′′       
                                                                                                                                x ′′
                                                    
                                            O                                                                                
  
                                                     Figure-AI-1 
Now baxxu  = constant 
Point of intersection; 
3
21 3
22==
( ) 21121
2
3 2
3
22 xax
p
abba −=  
0299 22
42
1
23
1 =+− paxax . 
Let us choose 22 2
3 ap = , we have 
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x ′′ xˆFigure-AI-1: The -  and   -x′ x′ˆ ′′  curves attain a maximum utility until they touch at the point 
‘y’ . So that maximum utility occur on the line but not in the interior of the triangle.                                                  
  
     
( ) 03
3
2 2
1
22
1 =+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⇒ axax0399 621231 =+− axax . 
2a1 3
2x =∴  is a double root. So, the parabola and hyperbolic curve are tangent only for 
the special value 
2
2 2
3 ap =  and the maximum point lies on the parabola and hyperbolic 
curve (AI-3) but not inside the parabola. 
 
 
BY THE METHOD OF LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER  
 
Maximize ( ) ( ) nn xxxxxxuxf ...,...,, 2121 == , 
subject to ( ) kxpxpxpxg nn =+++= ...2211 .   (AI-9) 
Let us introduce Lagrangian multiplierλ , 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ).... 221121 cxpxpxpxxxcxgxfF nnn −+++−=−−= Lλλx  
Now taking  
nx
F
x
F
x
F
∂
∂==∂
∂==∂
∂ L
21
0 ,                               (AI-10) 
we get, 
 
0
               
0
0
121
231
132
=−
=−
=−
− nn
n
n
pxxx
pxxx
pxxx
λ
λ
λ
L
LLL
L
L
 
so that ( ) ( ) pλλ ==− nnnn pppxxxxxxxxx ,,,,, 211213132 LLLL .                (AI-11)  
 
Consider the indifference hypersurface cxxx n ′=...21 .The normal to this at the point 
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)nx )
na
n
( xx ,...,, 21  is given by  ( ) ( . ,, 12131321 −=′−∇ nnnn xxxxxxxxxcxx LLLL    
 
According to (AI-11) this vector is proportional to p, which is normal to the plane (AI-9). Thus the 
normal to the indifference hypersurface is parallel to the normal to the plane. This is consistent with 
the plane being tangent to the hypersurface. 
Maximize,  aa xxAxu L21 21= ( ) ( )111119AI −−−−−=⇒− nn
n
n xpxpc
p
x L  
( ) ( ) nnn anannanaan pxpxpcxxAxxxf ÷−−−=∴ −−−− − 111112111 121, LLL . 
( )
( )
0
                                            111111
11111
1
1
1
1
1
1
=÷
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−−−
−−−−=∂
∂
−
−−−
−−
−
−
−
n
nn
n
n
a
n
a
nn
a
n
a
i
a
nn
i
a
na
i
i
p
xpxpcx
xpxpxpc
x
xxa
A
x
f
L
LLL
 
                                                                                                                                       i=1, 2,…,n-1. 
 
By (AI-10) we get, ( ) 01111 =−−−− −− iinnni xpaxpxpca L ,  i =1, 2, …,n-1.                      (AI-12) 
For n = 3 we have i =1, 2 then (AI-12) becomes ( ) ( ) 0     and   0 2232211211322111 =−−−=−−− xpaxpxpcaxpaxpxpca        (AI-13) ( ) ( ) cxaaaxpcxpxaapa =++=++⇒ −− 232121122131111      and     
212
22
1
11
aa
c
a
xp
a
xp
+==⇒ .  
For n = 5, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 we get from (AI-12) ( )
( ) . 0...
...                    ...                 ...      
0...
44544114
11544111
=−−−−
=−−−−
xpaxpxpca
xpaxpxpca
 
Similarly, we get  
414
44
1
11
...
...
aa
c
a
xp
a
xp
++=== . 
 
Therefore, we get 
 
nn
nn
aa
c
a
xp
a
xp
++=== ...... 11
11  
 
( )
( ) ....    
...1
1
1
11
−++=
−−−=
n
n
n
nn
n
n
aa
p
ca
xpxpc
p
x
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c′=
 
Indifference hypersurface is, 
xxAx nan
aa ...21 21  and the normal is ,  
( ) ( ) .
...
,...,
...
...
1
1
1
1
1 P
n
n
n
a
n
a
aa
cApp
aa
cAcxAx n ++=++=′−∇  
Thus, the plane being tangent to the hypersurface. Therefore, that in every case has the same result. 
 
Special case: 1 
 
Let us consider the parabola, 
 ( )2224 xaby −=        (AI-14) 
and indifference hyperbolic curve  
 
x
k
0
ykxy =⇒=        (AI-15) 
 . 44 232 =+− kxbxa
 
Let coincident roots occur at α=x  
 
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]. 224 444 22232
22232
βααβααβ
αβ
−+++−=
−−=+−
xxxa
xxakxbxa
 
 
Equating the coefficients; 
 ( )
,4
244
,02
22
222
ka
ab
−=
+=
=+
βα
αβα ,
αβ
  
.
33
8  and     
3
3
2
2
2
a
bk
a
b ==⇒α  
Again we have, 
a3
bx =  and 2
3
8 b
x
ky == . 
For hyperbolic curve, ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛==−∇ 1,
3
8
33
,
3
8,
2 ab
a
b
a
bbxykxy . 
For parabola, ( )[ ] ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛==−−∇ 1,381,84 2222 abxaxaby . 
So parabola and hyperbolic-curve are tangents i.e. maximum utility occurs on the parabola but not 
inside. 
 
Special Case 2:     
 
Let us consider the parabola and hyperbolic- curve 
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c+
0
bxaxy += 2  and x y = k, 
 . 23 =−++ kcxbxax
Let coincident roots occur at α=x  
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]. 22 2223
223
βααβααβ
αβ
−+++−=
−−=−++
xaxaxa
xxakcxbxax
 
 
Equating the coefficients we get, 
  
 
. 
2
02
2
2
ka =
=+
=+
βα
ααβ
a
c
αβ
 
So,  023 2 =++ cba αα
a
acbb
3
32 −−−=⇒α  and 
a
acbb
3
32 2 −+−=β  
( )
2
223
27
33292
a
acbacbabcbk −−+−=  
3
32 2bb ac
x
y −+−= . 
For hyperbolic curve, ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−==−∇ 1,
3
32,
2 acbbxykxy α . 
For parabola, [ ] ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−=−−=−−−∇ 1,
3
321,2
2
2 acbbbaxcbxaxy . 
So, the parabola and hyperbolic-curve are tangents i.e. maximum utility occurs on the parabola but 
not inside. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX-II 
 
Here we prove the reciprocity theorem (20). We first write down the conditions for the minimization 
of xp.  subject to the constraint (16) using the Lagrangian multipliers. Writing 
ix
u
i ∂∂=u , these 
conditions can be written as, 
 ( )[ 0. 0 =−−∂
∂ ku
xi
λxp ] , i = 1, 2, …, n    (AII-1) 
where λ  is the so called Lagrangian multiplier. Condition (AII-1) can be written as follows;  
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( )x ii up λ=   i =1, 2, …, n.     (AII-2) 
By (16) and (AII-2) constitute (n+1) equations for the n +1 unknowns λ,,..., 2 nxx1x . (The solution for this set of equations for x is what we have denoted by )px
p ip +
. Consider now a small 
variation in the price vector given by dp, that is each component  changes to . Let the 
corresponding change in 
i idp
x  be denoted by xd , that is, the vector which minimizes (p+dp).x subject 
to (16) is xd
0
x + .  
 .       (AII-3) ∑ == iidxudu
By (AII-2) we can write 
 0=∑ ii xdp .        (AII-4) 
Let P denote the total minimum price vector p subject to (16), that is, 
 ( )pxp.=P .        (AII-5) 
Taking the differentiation we get 
 ( ) ( ) ppxpxpxpP dddd ... =+= .     (AII-6) 
The left side of (AII-6) is a perfect differential so the right side must be of the form 
∑ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ∂∂ ipQ idp  for some function Q of p. So that we can write  
 
i
j
p
x
∂
∂
j
i
p
x =∂
∂
. 
 
 
